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FRIENDS, FAMILY, FIDUCIARIES: PERSONAL
RELATIONSHIPS AS A BASIS FOR INSIDER
TRADING VIOLATIONS
Ray J. Grzebielski+
From 1980, the date of the United States Supreme Court opinion in
Chiarella v. United States,' to the Court's opinion in United States v.
O'Hagan2 seventeen years later, the scope of the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) prohibition against trading in securities
with material, nonpublic information3 under Rule 10b-5,4 remained
' Associate Professor, DePaul University College of Law. B.A. 1970, Northwestern
University; M.B.A. 1981, University of Chicago; J.D. 1973, Northwestern University;
LL.M. 1978, Georgetown University. Member of the Illinois Bar. The author is greatly
indebted to Helena Kapjon for her secretarial assistance on this article.
1.
445 U.S. 222 (1980).
2.
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
3.
Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988) (stating that the Supreme Court
adopted a standard of materiality such that in a proxy solicitation context, "[ajn omitted
fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would
consider it important in deciding how to vote"). The Court also stated that "there must be
a substantial likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been viewed by
the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 'total mix' of information made
available." Id. at 231-32.
4.
Rule 10b-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998).
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 pursuant to authority granted to it under section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78-78mm (1994), which
provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange - . . . To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or
any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
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unsettled. The Supreme Court clarified how courts should apply Rule
10b-5 against insider trading in O'Hagan.5 The Court held that, in order
to violate Rule 10b-5 for insider trading, an individual must breach a duty
within a pre-existing relationship of trust or confidence. 6 This
relationship can be between the person abusing the information and
either a party to a securities transaction or a party from whom material,
nonpublic information was misappropriated .
Anyone receiving
information from a party breaching either duty violates Rule 10b-5 if the
information is received to further an improper purpose. s
The Court, however, has not addressed the situation in which a person
comes into possession of material, nonpublic information in the context
of a purely personal relationship, such as a family relationship or
friendship. In such a situation, a person can receive information merely
by sharing confidences incident to the personal relationship without the
intent of offering a trading advantage. Because there are difficulties in
finding a legally recognized relationship of trust and confidence between
family members or friends, a violation of Rule 10b-5 may occur if an
individual who receives information from a friend or family member uses
that information in securities transactions.
This Article argues that the sharing of corporate information between
family members and friends should be treated as if the information was
acquired incident to a fiduciary relationship. Consequently, when the
recipient of the information uses it to trade in securities, that person
violates Rule 10b-5. Further, this Article presents a detailed discussion
of the three U.S. Supreme Court decisions that define the connections
between personal relationships and prohibited trading. Additionally, this
Article presents the policy reasons for scrutinizing exchanges of
information within personal relationships for evidence of 10b-5
violations. Finally, the Article discusses the SEC's recent attempt to
clarify this issue by rule.
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1994) (emphasis added).

5.

521 U.S. at 650-53.

6.
O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652. Traditionally, parties with a duty of trust and
confidence include officers, directors, and shareholders owning greater than ten percent of
a corporation's outstanding stock. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994) (giving private parties the
right to recover from officers, directors, and shareholders who own more than ten percent
of the corporation's securities on behalf of a corporation's profits from trading in equity
securities during a six-month period). Company employees are considered insiders of a
corporation. See Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 647-48 (1983).

7.

O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 653.

8.

Id. at 652.
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I. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE ON INSIDER TRADING
The Supreme Court established the parameters of the prohibition
against insider trading in three decisions:9 Chiarella v. United States,'0
2 In Chiarella,
Dirks v. S. C." and United States v. O'Hagan.1
the Court
established that an individual trading in securities with material,
nonpublic information must breach a fiduciary duty in order to violate
Rule 10b-5. 3 In this case, the defendant, an employee of a financial
printing company, was accused of violating Rule 10b-5. 4 During his
employment, the defendant became aware of five corporate takeover
bids.15 Prior to the announcement of the bids, the defendant purchased
stock in the target companies; he sold the stock immediately after a
public announcement
of the bids and realized a profit of approximately
16
$30 thousand.
The Court characterized Chiarella as a case involving "the legal effect
of [the defendant's] silence." 7 Because neither the legislative history of
section 10(b) nor the history of the SEC's Rule 10b-5 provided guidance
with respect to silence, the Court reviewed SEC administrative precedent
and federal court decisions to determine the scope of Rule 10b-5 as
applied to the improper use of information. 8
In Chiarella, the Court restricted the reach of In re Cady, Roberts &
Co.'9 In that case, the SEC determined that a corporate insider must
abstain from trading in a corporation's shares until there was full
disclosure of all material, nonpublic information. 2 The SEC found that
this obligation arose from two elements: (1) the existence of a
relationship affording access to inside information intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose; and (2) the unfairness of allowing

9.
See generally Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987) (illustrating a fourth
decision where the Court was presented with criminal convictions for violations of Rule
10b-5 for trading on material, nonpublic information; however, the Court affirmed the
mail and wire fraud convictions and rendered no opinion on the insider trading violations).
10. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
11. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
12. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
13. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 227-28.
14. Id. at 224-25.
15. Id. at 224. The Court characterized four of the five takeover bids as tender offers.
Id. at 224 n.1. The Court, however, characterized the fifth transaction as a merger. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 226.
18. Id. at 226-30.
19. 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
20. Id. at 912-15.
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a corporate insider to take advantage of inside information without
disclosure. 2' The Court limited the reach of Cady, Roberts by explicitly
requiring a fiduciary duty between the parties to the transaction before a
violation of Rule 10b-5 can occur 22 The Court determined that "the
relationship between a corporate insider and the stockholders of his
corporation [that] gives rise to a disclosure obligation is not a novel twist
of the law." 3 The Court also found that fraud at common law occurred
only when the party failing to make a disclosure had a fiduciary
obligation or other relationship of trust and confidence giving rise to a
duty to disclose.24 The Court reviewed lower court decisions and its own
previous decision in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States1 and found
21. Id. at 912. Cady, Roberts is not a case in which the corporate insider traded for
his own account but rather is a tipping case. Id. at 907. The director of the corporation
conveyed information to the securities broker-dealer where he was employed and that
firm traded for its own account. Id. The Supreme Court has held that tipping violates
Rule 10b-5. See infra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
22. Chiraella,445 U.S. at 227-28.
23. Id. at 227.
24. Id. at 228. The Court also found that at common law "misrepresentation made
for the purpose of inducing reliance upon the false statement is fraudulent." Id. at 227-28.
In addition, although the SEC can prohibit "any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance," the SEC is not expressly given the power to define fraud. 15 U.S.C. §
78(j)(b). But see United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653-58, 666-67, 670-73 (1997)
(realizing the Supreme Court's effort to square the requirement of fraud with the different
construction it gave section 14(e) because Congress, in that section, empowered the SEC
to promulgate rules to prevent fraud).
25. 406 U.S. 128 (1972). In Affiliated Ute, the Court reviewed the special facts of the
defendants' dealings with the plaintiffs. Id. at 145-49. The Court concluded that the
defendants were market-makers and thereby owed a duty of disclosure of material facts to
the plaintiffs. Id. at 153. The sole source of authority which the Court cited for this duty
was Chasins v. Smith, Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 11.67 (2d Cir. 1970), a federal case arising
under Rule 10b-5. Id. The Court did not rely on common law requirements, but
concluded that there was a duty as a matter of federal law due to the special relationship
between the plaintiffs and the defendants. Id. at 152-53.
The lower court decisions on which the Court relied for the proposition that Rule 10b-5
cannot be violated in an omission of information case without a duty to disclose are
inapposite. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968). The
issue in Texas Gulf was based on a premise that parties to a securities transaction are
entitled to equal access to information, a policy expressly abandoned in Chiarella.
Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233. Frigitemp v. FinancialDynamics Fund, Inc., 524 F.2d 275 (2d
Cir. 1975), involved plaintiffs who already possessed the material information in question,
thus the Second Circuit did not decide the issue of duty to disclose. Id. at 283. The
Second Circuit's discussion on a duty to disclose merely pointed back to the Supreme
Court's decision in Affiliated Ute. Id. at 282. Finally, General Time Corp. v. Talley
Industries, Inc., 403 F.2d 159 (2d Cir. 1968), involved the issue of whether a corporation
acquiring another corporation's stock in open market purchases had to disclose its plans
before buying it. Id. at 164. The Second Circuit found that an acquiring corporation
ought to be able to use this information because the company should be rewarded for its
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that these decisions were consistent with a requirement of a pre-existing
relationship of trust and confidence, although they did not expressly nor
exclusively rely on this element. 26
When the Supreme Court looked to common law fraud principles, it
found that a duty to disclose was a necessary element to determine the
limits of Rule 10b-5, and the Court established a precedent that led to
the current state of insider trading law.27 Moreover, the Court never
explained why it resorted to common law principles to determine
6
disclosure and trading obligations under the federal securities laws.
Common law fraud doctrines exist in the context of commercial
dealings. 29 In public securities trading markets, buyers and sellers
generally do not personally negotiate with each other and thus, a buyer
or seller with material, nonpublic information can often conduct a
transaction without disclosing his identity or the material information in
his possession."' Where there is a public trading market, questionable
research and its willingness to assume substantial financial risks. Id. In any event, this
case was decided before the effective date of sections 13(d), 14(d), and 14(e) of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act, which mandates this disclosure once more than five percent of
the target's stock is acquired or a tender offer for that stock is made. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d),
78n(d), (e) (1997). The General Time court relied on the 1934 Act and its legislative
history as support for concluding that the acquiring company had no obligation to disclose
its plans under Rule 10b-5. GeneralTime, 403 F. 2d at 164-65.
26. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 230.
27. Id. at 227-28.
28. Id. at 227-29.
29. SEC v. CapitalGains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963). The Court said:
There has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the
doctrines of fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land
and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as
advice and securities, and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the
merchandise in issue.
Id.; see also Harry Shulman, Civil Liability and the SecuritiesAct, 43 YALE L.J. 227, 243-44
(1933-1934) (pointing out that defects in disclosure about stock need not harm the first
purchaser). In a public trading market, securities can change hands multiple times before
defects in disclosure are cured and the loss falls on the holder at the time disclosure is
made. Id. at 230. Common law doctrines, such as breach of warranty claims, were not
adapted to this particular feature of a public trading market. Id
30. When there are negotiations, the case will not be purely disclosure issues, but may
arguably involve misrepresentation or misleading statement issues. David S. Ruder, Texas
GulfSulphur - The Second Round: Privity and State Mind in Rule lOb-5 Purchaseand Sale
Cases,63 Nw. U. L. REV. 423,437 n.77 (1968). Once discussions start between two parties
interested in buying or selling securities, any discussions on the securities' value may be
materially misleading, if not outright false. Id. No one wants to make a bad deal and most
individuals will attempt to collect information to ascertain a security's value. See, e.g.,
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985) (finding that although corporate
stock is invariably a security, the buyer of the stock, among other things, conducted an
audit of the business). These cases are, therefore, different from transactions in public
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insider trading generally involves nondisclosure." Since the federal
securities laws were primarily aimed at regulating national trading
markets in securities, where those laws were intended to fill shortcomings
in state securities and common law, the Court should have considered
the securities market context to determine which uses of material,
nonpublic information would have been improper.32
The Court did not provide any guidance with respect to the sources of
law or custom that were relevant in determining whether there was a preexisting relationship of trust and confidence.
However, the Court's
discussion of the duties of corporate insiders was instructive since the
Supreme Court appeared to create a uniform duty for corporate
insiders. 4 The Court stated clearly that traditional corporate insiders
owed a duty to disclose all material information to all buyers and sellers
of a corporation's stock, or, in the alternative, to abstain from trading in
their corporation's stock.35 State law precedent on corporate insiders'
duties to shareholders, however, was not uniform and contained
significant gaps."
Case law interpreting corporate officials' duties to stockholders when
those officials bought stock gave rise to three approaches. The so-called
majority view found that corporate insiders owed no fiduciary duty to
stockholders when those insiders bought the company's stock.37 The
markets where the buyer and seller do not need to know each other and any party having
material, nonpublic information may be unable to cause public disclosure by the
corporation whose securities' value are affected.
31. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 236.
32. In Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375 (1983), the Court stated that:
[T]he anti fraud provisions of the securities laws are not coextensive with
common-law doctrines of fraud. Indeed, an important purpose of the federal
securities statutes was to rectify perceived deficiencies in the available commonlaw protections by establishing higher standards of conduct in the securities
industry .... We therefore find reference to the common law in this instance
unavailing.
459 U.S. at 388-89 (footnote and citations omitted).
33. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 232.
34. Id. at 227-29.
35. Id. at 230.
36. This lack of uniformity in state law may, in part, result from the passage of the
federal securities laws, since those laws have provided the primary basis for discussion of
the misuse of material nonpublic corporate information for over sixty years. L. Loss, The
Fiduciary Concept as Applied to Trading by Corporate "Insiders" in the United States, 33
MOD. L. REV. 34 (1970) (arguing that federal regulation "aborted" the development of
the common law).
37. See 3A WILLIAM MEADE FLECTCHER ET AL., FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1168.10 (perm ed., rev. vol. 1994) (stating that the
majority rule is that there is no fiduciary duty to stockholders); see also Bd. of Comm'ns v.
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minority view found the exact opposite: corporate insiders always had a
fiduciary duty to stockholders when buying corporate stock; there is a
duty of full disclosure.38 At common law, there existed a third view.
While, generally, corporate insiders owed no duty of disclosure to
stockholders in buying corporate stock, "special circumstances" could
arise from which courts could deem a duty to have been implied.39 Such
circumstances could have included an insider's knowledge of the
impending sale of the company or the fact that an insider wished to buy
company stock, facts a stockholder could not easily obtain upon
inspection of corporate books and records. 40
While there were many state law cases where corporate insiders
bought stock from existing shareholders, there was a dearth of state cases
which held that a fiduciary duty exists when an insider sells stock to a
non-stockholder.41 The only authority the Chiarella Court cites for this
proposition is dicta in a federal case that does not decide a state law
issue, but rather the scope and validity of section 16(b) of the Securities
Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509, 513 (Ind. 1873) (finding no fiduciary duty to stockholders); Seitz v.
Frey, 188 N.W. 266, 268 (Minn. 1922) (same); In re Clifton Trust, 93 A.2d 644, 647 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1952) (same).
38. See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 235 (Ga. 1903); Dawson v. Nat'l Life Ins.
Co., 157 N.W. 929, 937-38 (Iowa 1916).
39. See, e.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). In Strong, the Supreme Court,
reviewed a decision of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands and found that, while
there may be no general duty of a director to disclose to a shareholder his knowledge
regarding a company, such a duty may arise if special facts exist. Id. at 431. The director
of the company was negotiating the sale of the assets of the company and alone possessed
knowledge on how those negotiations were progressing. Id. at 431-32. The director
arranged to purchase shares while concealing that he was the buyer. Id. at 432. The
negotiations for the sale of the company's assets and the director's identity were the
special facts about which the Supreme Court found the failure to disclose constituted
fraud. Id. at 432-33; see also Fox v. Cosgriff, 159 P.2d 224 (Idaho 1945) (finding a duty to
disclose under special circumstances); Northern Trust Co. v. Essaness Theatres Corp., 108
N.E.2d 493 (Il. App. Ct. 1952) (same).
40. See supra note 39.
41. There is no state case law where a shareholder who bought shares from a
corporate insider was able to recover damages against the insider when it was later
determined that the insider failed to disclose adverse information about the company. H.
MANNE,

INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET

23 (1966).

An argument that

liability should not rest with an insider for failure to disclose was made to the Securities
and Exchange Commission in In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961). The
SEC rejected the argument saying: "This approach is too narrow. It ignores the plight of
the buying public - wholly unprotected from the misuse of special information." Id.
Diamondv. Oreamuno is a state law case which imposes liability on a corporate insider
for selling his company's shares when he had possession of material nonpublic adverse
information. 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969). The court permitted the corporation to recover
for the loss avoided by the insider. Id. at 913. The court found that the duty not to use the
information was owed to the company, not to the stockholders. Id. at 913.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:467

Exchange Act of 1934.42 Therefore, when the Supreme Court said that
the "[a]pplication of a duty to disclose prior to trading guarantees that
corporate insiders, who have an obligation to place the shareholder's
welfare before their own, will not benefit personally through fraudulent
use of material, nonpublic information," the Court created a uniform
fiduciary duty for corporate insiders under Rule 10b-5." The Court
clearly indicated that traditional insider trading could violate Rule 10b-5
and proved willing to decide that, in the context of federal securities law,
there exists a uniform relationship of trust and confidence for such
insiders."
Although the Court strongly suggested that trading on material,
nonpublic information by corporate insiders always violates Rule 10b-, 45
the Court's formulation of corporate insider's duties may only reach
corporate insiders when they trade in their corporation's stock. Hence,
Chiarellawas not likely the last word on insider trading.
There are at least two instances where insiders may trade on material,
nonpublic information about their own corporations if a duty is only
owed to shareholders. The first is where the corporate insider trades in
debt securities of the company. 6 For example, an insider may become
aware of developments that could favorably or unfavorably affect the
42. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227 n.8 (citing Gratz v. Claughton, 187
F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1951)). As Judge Learned Hand stated in that case:
For many years a grave omission in our corporation law had been its indifference
to dealings of directors or other corporate officers in the shares of their
companies.
When they bought shares, they came literally within the
conventional prohibitions of the law of trusts; yet the decisions were strangely
slack in so deciding. When they sold shares, it could indeed be argued that they
were not dealing with a beneficiary, but with one whom his purchase made a
beneficiary. That should not, however, have obscured the fact that the director
or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by the very sale; for it would
be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the advantage of his position to induce
the buyer into the position of a beneficiary, although he was forbidden to do so,
once the buyer had become one.
Gratz, 187 F.2d at 49.
The case, however, actually involved issues in a shareholder's derivative suit about the
validity of and measurement of recovery under section 16(b) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994), which permits the corporation to recover shortswing trading profits of a corporation's director, officer, or ten percent stockholder. Id.
There is no holding in the case imposing any liability on insiders selling shares under state
law in breach of a fiduciary duty owed to purchasers of the shares. See generallyid. Judge
Learned Hand merely states in dicta that such a result would be good policy. Id. at 49.
43. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,230 (1980).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 232.
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creditworthiness of the company. Instead of buying or selling corporate
stock, the insider could trade in debt securities of the company. When
the information regarding the company's creditworthiness becomes
public, the price of the debt securities could be affected. Under state
law, while insiders might owe duties to stockholders in trading stock,
generally corporate insiders owe no duties to the corporation's
creditors.47 There is no pre-existing relationship of trust and confidence
between the insider and creditors. 8 Consequently, trading in debt
securities, even by a traditional corporate insider, may not violate Rule
10b-5 when such trading is viewed in light of the Chiarellarationale.49
Second, since there is no pre-existing relationship of trust and
confidence between the insider and the other party to the transaction
when the insider buys or sells options traded on a national securities
exchange, an insider might use material, nonpublic information to trade
in those securities. 0 If the option being traded was a warrant issued by
the corporation, a corporate insider might have a fiduciary duty to the
warrant holder because a direct equity interest exists, but the issuer of
exchange-traded options is the Options Clearing Corporation, not the
corporation." These options can be created without the consent or
participation of the corporation whose underlying stock the holder can

47. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 932-33
(8th ed. 2000); see also Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 222 (Del. Ch. 1974), affd in
pertinent part, 347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975). If the corporation is insolvent, certain creditors
will be the residual risk takers and the shareholders' claims will be worthless. In the case
of insolvency, however, the directors may owe fiduciary duties to creditors. See, e.g.,
Geyer v. Ingersoll Publ'ns Co., 621 A.2d 784 (Del. Ch. 1992).
4& Harff, 324 A.2d at 222.
49. However, the use of corporate information for trading in debt securities would be
a "misappropriation" of information and would violate Rule 10b-5 under the reasoning of
United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), discussed infra notes 109-16and
accompanying text.
50. An option is expressly included in the definition of "security" in both the 1933
Securities Act and the 1934 Securities Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1)(1994); Id. §
78c(a)(10). A call option gives the holder the fight to buy stock for a period of time at a
set price. BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1121 (7th ed. 1999). A put option gives the holder
the right to sell stock for a period of time at a set price. Id. Therefore, an insider may not
owe a duty to the option holders. Laventhall v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 704 F.2d 407 (8th
Cir. 1983).
51. SEC, SPECIAL STUDY OF THE OPTIONS MARKETS 73-85 (1978) (providing a
description of the special characteristics of exchange-traded options); see also 17 C.F.R. §
240.9b-1 (2000) (stating one of the special rules promulgated by the SEC to fit the
exchange trading of options contracts within the federal securities laws disclosure system).
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purchase or sell if the option is exercised.52 Consequently, the holders of
the options have no existing relationship with the corporation. So long as
a corporate insider only buys and sells exchange-traded options without

buying or selling the corporation's stock, the insider owes no duty to the
other party to the transaction.53 To find a breach of Rule 10b-5 under
these circumstances would require "recognizing a general duty between
all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on material,
nonpublic information."" The ChiarellaCourt, however, would not find
a breach55 of Rule 10b-5 without "some explicit evidence of congressional

intent.,

The ChiarellaCourt suggested that Rule 10b-5 can prohibit traditional

insiders from trading on material, nonpublic information, regardless of
the security bought or sold. 6 The Court's requirement of a pre-existing
relationship of trust and confidence,57 however, leaves doubt whether
traditional insider trading on material, nonpublic information would
always violate Rule 10b-5. Either the Court was broadly formulating

duties for corporate insiders, regardless of the securities traded, or the
Court was effectively setting forth the foundation for recognizing the
misappropriation theory so that insiders could not evade the prohibition

52. The holder of the option does not ever need to own the underlying stock.
Although the holder can buy and then sell the option, he does not have to exercise the
option provided the position is closed before expiration.
Similarly, an insider could negotiate a unique option contract with another party,
usually a securities broker-dealer. Such privately negotiated option contracts, where the
securities are purchased by corporate insiders, were the focal point in the seminal insider
trading case SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 846-47 (2d Cir. 1968). The
purchase of the call options in Texas Gulf predated commencement of exchange traded
options in 1972. Id. at 843-47. While the Supreme Court in Chiarella cited Texas Gulf
with apparent approval, no conclusion can necessarily be drawn regarding whether a
fiduciary duty existed with respect to the call options. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S.
222, 229 (1980). The broker-dealer is the issuer of the option. Because this transaction is
clearly at arm's length, no duty to disclose information can be inferred. Any violation of
Rule 1ob-5 by an insider trading call options would have to be based on a different theory
than the one accepted by the Court in Chiarella. See, e.g., Walton v. Morgan Stanley &
Co., Inc., 623 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1980). In addition, it is unlikely that the securities
The securities broker-dealer should be
broker-dealer is harmed in any way.
knowledgeable about the securities markets when an insider wishes to negotiate an
options contract. It is reasonable to conclude that the insider believes the broker-dealer
has market moving information. In any event, it is only prudent for the broker-dealer to
hedge the option since he has a built in profit and is hedged against any losses.
53. Laventhall, 704 F.2d at 414.
54. Chiarella,445 U.S. at 233.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 226-29.
57. Id. at 230.
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on the use of material, nonpublic information. The Court believed that
trading by traditional insiders on material, nonpublic information
violated Rule 10b-5 and, as such, the Court further concluded that
insiders always owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation's stockholders.58
However, the Court was reluctant to venture into broad pronouncements
on the use of information by outsiders to the corporation.59
The Court's decision also raised questions about the scope of Rule
10b-5 with regard to trading in securities by outsiders to a corporation. °
Most outsiders to a publicly traded company owe no duty to the market
in general. 6' The Court stated that the mere possession of material,
nonpublic information does not give rise to any duty to disclose the
information before trading. 62 What the Court left unresolved is whether
the breach of duty to another party or misappropriation of another
party's information, where the information obtained is used to trade on
securities, can violate Rule 10b-5. 63 Of particular importance are
situations where the party defrauded does not trade in securities and,
therefore, no duty was owed to the other party in the securities
transaction. 64 In other words, while there may be fraud in connection
with a securities transaction, if a securities trader cannot be defrauded,
how can there be securities fraud?
This "misappropriation theory" raises several additional difficulties.
Under this theory, an outsider, like the individual in Chiarella, would
owe no general duty to the market.6 With no duty owed to a buyer or
seller of securities, no one can privately enforce Rule 10b-5 even though
acceptance of the "misappropriation theory" means the rule was
violated. 66 For example, where the party defrauded is an employer, but
the employer is not the purchaser or seller, no duty is owed to the market
or to the traders in securities. 6' To find that a trader is able to sue
58. Id.
59. Id. at 234.
60. Id. at 232-33.
61. Id.
62
Id. at 235.
63. See generally id. In Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 749-55
(1975), the Court held that only purchasers or sellers of securities can enforce Rule 10b-5
in a private cause of action.
64. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662-64 (1983).
65. Id. See generally Chiarella,445 U.S. at 224 (stating that the petitioner was not an
outsider).
66. See Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983).
67. Id. at 14-15. In Moss, the Second Circuit ruled that even though there may be
criminal violations of Rule 10b-5 on the same facts, persons who sold securities while the
defendant traded securities have no cause of action against the defendant since there was
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without a relationship of trust and confidence with the other party of the
transaction is tantamount to finding that an action exists for mere
possession of material, nonpublic information, a result clearly
inconsistent with Chiarella.6
Approximately three years after Chiarella the Supreme Court decided
Dirks v. SEC.69 This case clarified when "tippees" of information would

no duty owed to them. Id. The plaintiffs suggested three bases on which private liability
might be premised. Id. at 13-15. The plaintiffs first maintained that the fiduciary duty
owed to the employer gave rise to a separate duty to the trading public derivatively. Id. at
13. The court refused to find a disclosure duty to the public because the employees of
Morgan Stanley owed no duty to disclose or abstain from trading. Id.
Plaintiffs next argued that Morgan Stanley and its employee were "insiders" based on
the fact that the takeover was friendly, and thus, Morgan Stanley and its employee owed a
duty to the target's shareholders. Id. The court rejected this argument for two reasons.
Id. at 13-14. First, the court held that there was no showing that Morgan Stanley or its
employee received any information from the target. Id. at 13. Second, there was no
fiduciary duty which Morgan Stanley owed the target since there was arm's length
bargaining between Morgan Stanley's client and the target. Id. at 14; see also Walton v.
Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F.2d 796, 798 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that no duty was owed by
an investment banker to a takeover target where the banker's client was dealing at arm's
length with the target).
Finally, the court rejected the argument that, since Morgan Stanley was a securities
broker-dealer, it owed a special duty to the market which could provide a bases for civil
liability. Moss, 719 F.2d at 14. The court found nothing in the language or legislative
history of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act to require a higher standard of conduct by
broker-dealers in dealing with material, nonpublic information. Id. at 15.
68. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. Congress added section 20A to the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act which provides in relevant part:
Any person who violates any provision of this chapter or the rules or regulations
thereunder by purchasing or selling a security while in possession of material,
nonpublic information shall be liable in an action in any court of competent
jurisdiction to any person who, contemporaneously with the purchase or sale of
securities that is the subject of such violation, has purchased (where such
violation is based on a sale of securities) or sold (where such violation is based on
a purchase of securities) securities of the same class.
15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(a) (1994). Congress acted out of fear that insiders might trade with
parties who were not security holders of the corporation or that outsiders might be sued
for violating Rule 10b-5. Congress provided contemporaneous traders with standing to
sue persons misusing material, nonpublic information. Id. While Congress permitted
persons to whom no duty of disclosure was owed to enforce Rule 10b-5, it did not
Whether congressional action
expressly recognize the "misappropriation theory."
sanctioned the theory, however, was subject to argument. See, e.g., SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 449-50 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the court used the legislative history, rather than
the statutory language to support its conclusion that the "misappropriation theory"
provided a basis for a Rule lob-5 violation); see also Lawrence E. Mitchell, The
Jurisprudence of the Misappropriation Theory and the New Insider Trading Legislation:
From Fairness to Efficiency and Back, 52 ALB. L. REV. 775, 838 (1988) (discussing the
duty requirement in Chiarella).
69. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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479

violate Rule 10b-5. 70 The Court suggested that people could be
"temporary insiders" bound by a duty to disclose or refrain from trading
on material, nonpublic information. The Court suggested approval of
the misappropriation theory 2 The Court left many of the questions that
remained open after Chiarellaunsettled. 73
Dirks, an insurance company securities analyst, received material,
nonpublic information regarding fraudulent bookkeeping at Equity
Funding of America from current and former employees of the
company.74 As Dirks investigated, he shared the information he
uncovered with clients and investors. 75 Subsequently some of these
investors sold their holdings of Equity Funding stock. 76
The SEC investigated Dirks' action and concluded: "Where 'tippees' regardless of their motivation or occupation - come into possession of
material 'corporate information that they know is confidential and know
or should know came from a corporate insider,' they must either publicly
disclose that information or refrain from trading., 77 The SEC, however,
only censured Dirks and, by a divided panel, the Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia affirmed.78
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals' decision.79 First, the
Supreme Court reiterated what it said in Chiarella; specifically, a
fiduciary relationship between the parties trading was a necessary
prerequisite to establish a violation of Rule 10b-5 for insider trading."°
The Supreme Court stated that the "typical tippee has no such
relationships [with shareholders]."'" Consequently, the SEC and the
courts have had analytical difficulties in policing tippees.2

70.

71.
72.

Id. at 661-64.
Id. at 653.
See id. at 657-58.

73. Id. at 662-64.
74. Id. at 648-49. Ronald Secrist, a former officer of Equity Funding of America, told
Dirks that the company's assets were "vastly overstated." Id. at 649. While senior
management of the company denied the fraud, other employees of Equity Funding
confirmed Secrist's information. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 651 (quoting 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1407 (1981)).
78. Id. at 651-52.
79. Id. at 667.
80. Id. at 654-55.
81. Id. at 655.
82. Id.
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According to the SEC, when Dirks received material, nonpublic
information, he inherited the insiders' duties to Equity Funding
shareholders. 3 The Supreme Court criticized this argument as being
little different from the argument that the Court rejected in Chiarella.84
The Supreme Court made clear that the possession of material,
nonpublic information does not, in and of itself, give rise to a duty to
disclose or to refrain from trading. 5 The Court went further and claimed
that the SEC position "appears rooted in the idea that the antifraud
provisions require equal information among all traders." ' The Court
likely overstated the SEC's position on this point. While it may be
inappropriate, in deciding the scope of insider trading, to distinguish
between information sourced to the corporation and information arising
outside the company, the SEC's position, at most, advocates equal access
to information sourced to the corporation because only insiders are likely
to have duties of disclosure to shareholders."'
While the Court rejected any automatically inherited derivative duty
from insiders to tippees, the Court said that "[t]he need for a ban on
some tippee trading is clear." ' To hold otherwise would have allowed
"'devious dealings in the name of others that the trustee could not
conduct [on] his own."' 89 The Court reiterated what it said in Chiarella,
that "[t]he tippee's obligation has been viewed as arising from his role as
a participant after the fact in the insider's breach of a fiduciary duty."'
Consequently, a breach of fiduciary duty occurs if the information is
disclosed by an insider to a tippee for an improper purpose.9 The insider
must personally benefit, directly or indirectly, from the disclosure." The
breach of duty relates to the personal gain of the insider which may be
pecuniary but can also be more intangible, such as a benefit to reputation

83. Id. at 655-56.
84. Id. at 656.
85. Id. at 657.
86. Id.
87. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 240 n.1 (1980) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (noting that "[alcademic writing in recent years has distinguished between
'corporate information' - information which comes from within the corporation and
reflects on expected earnings or assets - and 'market information' .... It is clear that §
10(b) and Rule 10b-5 by their terms and by their history make no such distinction").
88. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 659.
89. Id. (quoting Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267, 271 (1951)).
90. Id. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230 n. 12).
91. Id. at 662 (stating that the insider releasing the information must benefit from the
release for a breach of duty to occur).
Id. at 663.
92
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that will translate into future earnings.93 Since Dirks was "a stranger to
Equity Funding with no pre-existing fiduciary duty to its shareholders"94
and the insiders' disclosure of information to Dirks was to expose fraud
not for personal gain, the Supreme Court concluded that Dirks did not
violate Rule 10b-5. 95
In Dirks, the Court reiterated that possession of material, nonpublic
information by itself was an insufficient basis to establish a Rule 10b-5
violation. 96 However, the Court did clarify the law for temporary
insiders, and suggested that the "misappropriation theory" could provide
a basis for establishing a violation of Rule 10b-5. 79 For tippee liability,
the Court required the insider to disclose corporate information to the
tippee with an improper purpose. 9' Yet there are many circumstances
where insiders may reveal corporate information legitimately to
outsiders so they may perform services for the corporation's benefit.99
The Court itself suggested that "an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or
consultant working for the corporation... may become fiduciaries of the
shareholders."' 00 These "temporary insiders" receive confidential
information solely for corporate purposes. 1
Their use of this
information for trading in securities would make them primary violators
of Rule 10b-5, not secondary violators like tippees.1°2
The Court suggested in dicta that misappropriation of information for
trading in securities could violate Rule 10b-5. °3 In discussing whether
Dirks violated Rule 10b-5, the Court said that he did not
1°4
"misappropriate or illegally obtain information about Equity Funding."

93. Id.
94. Id. at 665.
95. Id. at 667.
96. Id. at 654.
97. Id. at 654-55, 659-60.
98. Id. at 660.
99. Id. at 655 n.1.
100. Id. at 655 n.14.
101. Id.
102 Id. (citing Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228,
237 (2d Cir. 1974)).
103. Id. at 660.
104. Id. at 665. SEC v. Lund was the first case to apply this principle. 570 F. Supp.
1397, 1399-1403 (C.D. Cal. 1983). The defendant was not a corporate officer or employee
of the company on whose information he traded. Id. at 1399. He received his information
from the company's president when the president was seeking other participants in a
nonpublic transaction. Id. at 1400. The president was satisfying his duty to the
corporation in communicating with the defendant so he could not be a tipper of the
information. Id. at 1402. But the court held the defendant as a temporary insider. Id. at

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:467

The Court intimated that this factor could be considered to determine if
Dirks violated Rule 10b-5.'05
Before the Supreme Court decided that the misappropriation of
material, nonpublic information could provide a basis for a Rule 10b-5
violation, the Court considered the question of insider trading only once.
° the Supreme Court did not decide
In Carpenter v. United States,'O
whether the misappropriation theory was a valid basis because the Court
was evenly divided on the issue. 1'° Instead, the eight justices decided that
the misappropriation of the Wall Street Journal's proprietary
information to trade in securities for the personal profit of an employee
and his tippees violated federal mail and wire fraud statutes."" This
holding had the paradoxical consequence of finding a criminal violation
for a misuse of information for securities trading under a general federal
antifraud statute, while failing to find a violation of the federal securities
laws, which are more specifically directed to regulating trading in
securities.
Finally, in 1997, the Supreme Court decided, in United States v.
O'Hagan,"° that the misappropriation of information in breach of a
fiduciary duty violated Rule 10b-5."' O'Hagan worked as an attorney at
the law firm of Dorsey & Whitney in Minneapolis, Minnesota.! In July
1988, Grand Metropolitan PLC (Grand Met), a London based company,
hired Dorsey & Whitney to represent it in connection with a potential
tender offer for the stock of the Pillsbury Company." 3 While Dorsey &
Whitney was still representing Grand Met, O'Hagan bought Pillsbury
call options with an expiration date in September 1988, and later
purchased additional call options and five thousand shares of Pillsbury

1403. Since the defendant was dealing with the other corporation at arm's length and not
as a fiduciary, id. at 1400, this decision may be decided incorrectly.
105. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 665.
106. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
107. Id. at 24.
108. Id. In that case, a writer for the Wall Street Journal leaked the contents of
several "Heard on the Street" columns before publication. Id. at 22. Although the
information in these columns was public and reliable, the packaging of the information
about particular firms in a widely read column could move market prices of the subject
company's corporate stock prices. Id. Trading on this information yielded significant
trading profits. Id. at 23.
109. Id. at 28.
110. 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
111. Id. at 652.
112. Id. at647.
113. Id.
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common stock.1 4 After Grand Met's announcement of its tender offer
for Pillsbury, O'Hagan sold his Pillsbury call options and stock for a
profit of $4.3 million."5 The Eighth Circuit reversed O'Hagan's Rule
10b-5 convictions, finding that they could not be justified by using the
"misappropriation theory.""' 6 The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that
the misappropriation theory could provide a basis for a criminal
conviction under Rule lOb-5." 7
The Supreme Court characterized the misappropriation theory as
"hold[ing] that a person commits fraud 'in connection with' a securities
transaction, and thereby violates [section] 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he
misappropriates confidential information for securities trading purposes,
in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information."" 8 The Court
viewed this theory as a necessary complement to the classical theory
espoused in Chiarella that corporate insiders could not trade on
nonpublic information because they have a relationship of trust and
confidence to stockholders." 9 Although the classical theory only reaches
insiders, the misappropriation theory reaches outsiders with no pre-

existing duty to the security holders with whom they trade. 2° The Court
concluded that the section 10(b) requirement of deception is met under
the misappropriation theory because there is non-disclosure of the
scheme to trade securities to the source of the information. 2' The fraud
committed under the misappropriation theory is "in connection with the
purchase or sale of [a] security" because the fraud is "consummated, not
when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but, when, without
disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or sell

114. Id. at 647-48. Because Grand Met's tender offer for Pillsbury was not announced
until October 4, 1988, O'Hagan's profit on the purchase of these call options may not have
come from the use of material, nonpublic information; the information on the takeover
may already have been public. Id. at 647. O'Hagan pointed to news reports antedating his
purchases that Grand Met was interested in acquiring Pillsbury. Id. at 648 n.i. O'Hagan's
challenge remained open for consideration on remand. Id.
115. Id. at 648.
116. Id. at 649.
117. Id. at 666. The Eighth Circuit followed United States v. Bryan, which rejected the
misappropriation theory. 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995). Three other courts of appeals
had adopted the misappropriation theory. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551,
566 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1991); SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 453 (9th Cir. 1990).
11& O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 652.
119. Id.
120. Id.at 652-53.
121. Id. at 653.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 51:467

securities."' 2 Additionally, and perhaps most importantly, the Court
concluded that:
In sum, considering the inhibiting impact on market
participation of trading on misappropriated information, and
the Congressional purposes underlying § 10(b), it makes scant
sense to hold a lawyer like O'Hagan as a § 10(b) violator if he
works for a law firm representing the target of a tender offer,
but not if he works for a law firm representing the bidder.' 3
The Court struggled with precedent in reaching this decision. The
Court's willingness to find a violation of Rule 10b-5 when a duty is owed
to someone other than a party to a securities transaction shows that the
Court will recognize an insider trading violation when it believes that
nonpublic material information is being abused.2 4
In Santa Fe Industries Inc. v. Green,'25 the Court expressly held that a
claim under Rule 10b-5 must be based on an element of deception.'2 But
under the misappropriation theory in O'Hagan,the party deceived is the
party to whom a fiduciary duty is owed, not a buyer or seller of
securities.'27 The Supreme Court finds deception when:
Full disclosure forecloses liability under the misappropriation
theory: Because the deception essential to the misappropriation
theory involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if
the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on
the nonpublic information, there is no 'deceptive device' and
thus no § 10(b) violation - although the fiduciary-turned-trader

122- Id. at 655-56.
123. Id. at 659.
124. See id. at 652.
125. 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
126. Id. at 473-74. Santa Fe Industries owned ninety-five percent of the stock of Kirby
Lumber Corpation. Id. at 462. Section 253 of the Delaware Corporation Law permits a
parent corporation owning more than ninety percent of a subsidiary corporation's stock to
engage in a "short-form" merger. Id. The parent corporation's board of directors can
authorize the merger of its subsidiary into the parent without the subsidiary's approval
and can set the consideration to be given to the subsidiary's minority stockholders. Id.
Santa Fe's board authorized such a merger with Kirby Lumber whereby the minority
stockholders would receive cash. Id. at 466. The case came before the Court on the basis
that "[t]he Complaint failed to allege a material misrepresentation or material failure to
disclose." Id. at 474. The minority shareholders' complaint only raised questions of the
fairness of the transaction. See id. at 462.
127. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 652.
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may remain liable under state law for breach of a duty of
loyalty.' 2'
Under state law, however, breaches of the duty of loyalty usually
involve both a breach of a duty of disclosure and an unfair transaction.' 29
These two elements are presumably present and tightly bound together
because if there is disclosure of the questionable transaction, the party to
whom the disclosure was made has the option to raise an objection to the
In Santa Fe
transaction, commence litigation, or grant permission. '
Industries, for example, the conceded full disclosure to minority
stockholders served only to provide information to enforce state law
claims, whether by seeking an appraisal of shares or a suit for breach of
fiduciary duty.'3 ' Otherwise, if permission is granted, there is no breach
of the duty of loyalty or misappropriation of the information.32
Yet the deception required to establish an action for federal securities
fraud is the unfair use of information in a securities trading market and
not the failure to tell an employer that information will be used to trade
securities.'33 The Court stated that a "fiduciary's fraud is consummated,
not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but when,
without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to purchase or
12& Id. at 655. Despite the fact that Santa Fe Industries was decided before Chiarella
v. United States, in the latter case the Court spoke of Rule 10b-5 as prohibiting fraud, not
manipulation or deception. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222,227-30 (1980).
129. O'Hagen,521 U.S. at 655 (footnote omitted).
130. In Globe Woolen, Judge Cardozo found that a director of a corporation had
breached his duty of loyalty and discussed this breach as one of the risks of the transaction
and its unfairness. Id. at 379-81. Even in Talbot v. James, 190 S.E.2d 759 (S.C. 1972),
where the court discussed the defendant's breach in terms of failures of disclosure, the
underlying transaction was unfair in that it was at variance with a previous agreement
between the plaintiffs and the defendant. Id. at 764-65. The ALI divides the duty of
loyalty into express obligations of disclosure and some inquiry into a transaction's fairness.
ALl, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
199-207 (1994). The ALl tries to reward disclosure by lessening the judicial scrutiny into
the transaction if the transaction was disclosed and approved by disinterested parties. Id.
at 206.
131. Sante Fe, 430 U.S. at 466-68.
132. See, e.g., Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y.
1918). Permission granted after disclosure of conduct will be fully recognized only if the
procedure for granting it is informed and fair. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,
401 F.2d 833, 856-57 (2d Cir. 1968) (discussing the obligations of persons with material,
nonpublic information to whom the corporation granted stock options). The possibility
existed that later ratification of the grant of these options by the corporation would at
least cure any state law claim for breach of duty of loyalty. Id. Because the options in
Texas Gulf were ratified without appreciation of the illegality of their grant, id., the
ratification may have been flawed. However, disclosure with approval would negate any
misappropriation of information.
133. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651-52.
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sell securities."' The Court also stated that "[t]he securities transaction
and the breach of duty thus coincide."' 35 The Court conceded, however,
that the consolidation of the transaction and the breach occurs "even
though the person or entity defrauded is not the other party to the trade,
6
but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic information."'1
This concession raises the question of how acceptance of the
misappropriation theory squares with the Court's previous reluctance to
find violations of Rule 10b-5 when an individual breaches some state law
duty. In Santa Fe Industries, the Court stated that:
To the extent that the Court of Appeals would rely on the use
of the term "fraud" in Rule 10b-5 to bring within the ambit of
the Rule all breaches of fiduciary duty in connection with a
securities transaction, its interpretation would . . . "add a gloss
to the operative language quite different from its commonly
accepted meaning."
Yet in O'Hagan,the Court did precisely the opposite.
In Santa Fe Industries,the Court rejected a claim that the payment of
an unfair price by a controlling shareholder to a minority shareholder in
a cash-out merger violated Rule 10b-5. 3 ' Payment of an unfair price
would breach the fiduciary duties the controlling stockholders owe the
minority shareholders under state law.'
But without deception,
misrepresentation or nondisclosure, directed toward the minority
shareholders, the Court refused to find a violation of Rule 10b-5.'4
The Court has also refused to find a violation of the federal securities
laws on the basis of breach of fiduciary duty covered by state corporate
law. In Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. , the Supreme Court
again required misrepresentation or nondisclosure to establish a
violation of the federal securities laws, specifically, under section 14(e) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.142 Faced with Burlington's hostile
bid for 25.1 million shares of El Paso Gas Company stock at $24 a share,
43
El Paso's management negotiated a friendly deal with Burlington.
134. Id. at 656.
135. Id.
136. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 656.
137. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) (quoting Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 199 (1976)).
138. Id. at 474.
139. Id. at 478.
140. Id. at 480.
141. 472 U.S. 1 (1984).
142. Id. at 8.
143. Id. at 2.
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Burlington withdrew its original offer and made a second one, which
consisted of $24 a share but for only twenty-one million shares and, in
pertinent part, that Burlington would "recognize 'golden parachute'
contracts between El Paso and four of its senior officers."' 44 The plaintiff
claimed that Burlington's withdrawal of the first offer and the
substitution of the second "was a 'manipulative' distortion of the market
for El Paso stock."'45 The plaintiffs also argued that defendants violated
section 14(e)'s prohibition by failing to disclose these "golden
parachutes" to shareholders. 46 The Court found that violations of
section 14(e) for manipulative acts required misrepresentation or
nondisclosure and refused to find a violation on
the basis of a breach of
47
fiduciary duty covered by state corporate law.
One other Supreme Court decision strongly suggests that not every
fraud, even those involving deception in securities transactions, will
violate federal securities laws. In Rubin v. United States,'41 a corporate
vice president sought a secured loan from Bankers Trust to replace a
temporary loan. 149 Not only did the vice president misrepresent his
corporation's financial position, but he also misrepresented the value and
marketability of the stock his corporation would use as collateral.'o In
deciding that the pledge of securities to Bankers Trust constituted a sale
and therefore federal securities laws applied, the Court cautioned that
the misrepresentations related to the stock being pledged and therefore
held that it did not have to decide whether the misstatements about the
borrower's financial condition provided a basis for a violation of federal
securities laws."' Moreover, in Marine Bank v. Weaver, the Court noted

144. Id. at 3-4. The Court defined a golden parachute as "agreements between a
corporation and its top officers which guarantee those officers continued employment,
payment of a lump sum, or other benefits in the event of a change of corporate
ownership." Id. at 3 n.2. One of the other terms of this offer was that Burlington would
buy over four million shares at $24 a share directly from El Paso. Id. at 3. One
consequence of this sale of stock to Burlington was to protect the friendly takeover. Id.
Any bidder but Burlington would have to buy four million additional shares to take
complete control of El Paso, at a cost to another bidder of as much as an additional $100
million. Id.
145. Id. at 4.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 12.
148. 449 U.S. 424 (1981).
149. Id. at 425.
150. Id. at 426.
151. Id. at 429 n.6.
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that "Congress, in enacting the securities
52 laws, did not intend to provide
a broad federal remedy for all fraud.'
When the Court decided O'Hagan, it recognized that the
misappropriation theory was a necessary adjunct to the classical theory
of insider trading whereby insiders violate Rule 10b-5 when they trade
their company's stock based on material, nonpublic information. 53 Rule
10b-5 cannot be confined to finding liability where insiders trade and
fully deal with information abuses in a trading market. In Chiarella,the
Court resorted to common law to determine the scope of Rule 10b-5 and
found that insider trading can only be based on a breach of a relationship
of trust or confidence. 54 This caused a convoluted development of the
law. Additionally, the Court has created uniform federal fiduciary duties
where there were none under state law, 55 and found that fraud on a party
not trading securities can give rise to a federal securities law violation,
effectively enforcing state law obligations as a matter of federal securities
law. 5 6 Throughout, it is clear that the Court has found that trading on
nonpublic information can violate Rule 10b-5 when the use of that
information is unfair, regardless of the rhetoric in which the Court
framed its decisions.
II. PERSONAL OR FAMILY RELATIONSHIP AS A BASIS FOR RULE 10B-5
VIOLATIONS

The unsettled question is whether a personal or family relationship can
provide a basis for Rule 10b-5 violations. To violate Rule 10b-5, there

must be a misappropriation of information,"' and the friends or family
members must have a fiduciary relationship between each other which is
breached by trading in securities.'58

Determining whether a fiduciary relationship among family members
or friends exists for purposes of Rule 10b-5 poses a dilemma. On one
hand, the mere existence of a friendship or a family relationship does not

152. 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982) (citing Great Western Bank & Trust v. Kotz, 532 F.2d
1252, 1253 (9th Cir. 1976); Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1114 (5th Cir. 1974)).
153. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-52 (1997).
154. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 227-29 (1980).
155. Id. at 230.
156. Id.
157. O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 652.
158. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2000).

2002]

Insider Trading Violations

provide a basis under state law to find a confidential relationship."9
Something more is required; the quality of the relationship matters.6l
If state law controls for purposes of the federal securities laws, an
inquiry would be made into the quality of private personal relations
between individuals. However, an inquiry into the quality of personal
relationships to determine if there is a fiduciary relationship is very
different from merely concluding that a fiduciary relationship exists
because there is a certain relationship between the parties. For example,
a corporate employee owes fiduciary duties to the corporation regardless
of the quality or nature of the employee's work.1 6 Similarly, all partners
owe a fiduciary duty to each other, without regard to how well the
partners work together.1'6
In addition, when state courts do not find a legally enforceable
relationship of trust and confidence between all family members or
friends, those courts are showing a reluctance to interfere with purely
private concerns.' 4 Without a legally enforceable relationship, judicial
relief would be unavailable. An inquiry into the quality of these
relationships under Rule 10b-5 would breach this wall of privacy.
On the other hand, to find that certain family or personal relationships
are always fiduciary in nature raises two separate issues. First, making
this finding for the purpose of Rule 10b-5 would create a new legal
relationship as a matter of federal law. Admittedly, the Court in
Chiarella did not say what sources to look to in order to determine
whether there is a relationship of trust and confidence, but rather created
a uniform law for corporate insiders where there was no uniform state
law.' 6 In the context of personal relationships, however, there is even
less of a foundation under state law to legally conclude that a fiduciary
relationship always exists among friends or family members' 6 For
corporate insiders, some states have found that a fiduciary relationship
159. United States v. Reed, 601 F. Supp. 685, 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("However, mere
kinship does not of itself establish a confidential relation.") (quoting G.G. BOGERT, THE
LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES 300-11 (Rev. 2d ed. 1978)), rev'd, 773 F.2d 477 (2d Cir.

1985).
160. Id.
161. Id. at 705; see also United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991).
16Z O'Hagan,521 U.S. at 651-52.
163. Id. at 652.
164. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1958), cited in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 580 (2d Cir. 1991).
165. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
166. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,603 (Dec. 28, 1999) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230,240,243, 249).
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always exists with shareholders; however, state law generally does not
67
find a confidential relationship on the basis of family ties alone.
Concluding that certain personal and family relations are presumably
fiduciary in nature conflicts with the Supreme Court's requirement that a
pre-existing relationship of trust and confidence be expressly
established. 6'

This dilemma underscores the difficulties which arose as a result of the
Supreme Court's insistence that a duty to disclose information only arises
when there is a relationship of trust and confidence because, under the
common law, such a duty was necessary in order to establish fraud. 69
Instead, an inquiry should be made into whether, in the context of
publicly traded securities, trading on nonpublic material information
should be rewarded. There should be an incentive to find and analyze
information so that securities can trade efficiently.' 70 Persons obtaining
information, not by investigation or analysis but by virtue of position,
however, should not be allowed to use that information for their own
profit. This is particularly important where the use of the information
prevents the owner of the information from fully exploiting it because of
its premature disclosure. 7' The status of parties such as corporate
insiders, partners, or other trustees, can be used to capture traders whose
use of information constitutes an unfair advantage. Consequently,
information received by family members or personal friends should not
be used for trading in securities.
The definition of family relationship or friendship does not need to be
specific. In the case of family, the inquiry could be so basic as to
establish that a relationship by blood or marriage exists. Similarly, for
friends, the inquiry should only determine if the parties are strangers to
each other. This broad formulation would not be over inclusive because
the sharing of market moving information without improper tipping
would be between parties who are closely related or are friends.
The fact that family relationships or friendships at common law do not
invariably involve fiduciary duties should not matter. State courts are
justifiably reluctant to adjudicate disputes between family members.

Even if family members or friends are fiduciaries to each other under the
167. See supra notes 18-31 and accompanying text.
168. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 21-27.
170. See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
171. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 658-59 (1983) (discussing why analysts should be
encouraged to "ferret out and analyze information") (quoting 21 SEC Docket 1401, 1406
(1981)).
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federal securities laws, the party to whom any duty is owed will not be a
purchaser or seller of securities and, thus, he will be unable to sue under
Rule 10b-5.7 Although a family member may be a defendant in a civil
action, the plaintiff would likely be a stranger who contemporaneously
traded with him.1 73
III. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE CoMMIssIoN's

NEW RULE 10B5-2

In order to deal with the question of whether personal or family
relationships can create liability under Rule 10b-5, the SEC adopted
Rule 10b5-2, which provides:
Preliminary Note to § 240.10b-2: This section provides a nonexclusive definition of circumstances in which a person has a
duty of trust or confidence for purposes of the
"misappropriation" theory of insider trading under Section
10(b) of the Act and Rule 10b-5. The law of insider trading is
otherwise defined by judicial opinions construing Rule 10b-5,
and Rule 10b5-2 does not modify the scope of insider trading
law in any other respect.
(a) Scope of Rule. This section shall apply to any violation of
Section 10(b) of the Act (15 U.S.C. 78j(b)) and § 240.10b-5
thereunder that is based on the purchase or sale of securities on
the basis of, or the communication of, material, nonpublic
information misappropriated in breach of a duty of trust or
confidence.
(b) Enumerated "duties of trust or confidence." For purposes of
this section, a "duty of trust and confidence" exists in the
following circumstances, among others:
(1) Whenever a person agrees to maintain information in
confidence;
(2) Whenever the person communicating the material
nonpublic information and the person to whom it is
communicated have a history, pattern, or practice of sharing
confidences, such that the recipient of the information knows or
reasonably should know that the person communicating the
172. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (1975) (holding
that only purchasers or sellers of securities can enforce Rule 10b-5); see also Chiarella v.
United States, 445 U.S. 222, 237-38 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring).
173. See United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 577-78 (2d Cir. 1991) (Winter, J.,
dissenting) (citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary
Privileges, and the Production of Information, 1981 Sup. Cr. REV. 309, 313-14, 331-36
(1981). For an earlier article on noncorporate insiders use of material, nonpublic
information see Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and InformationalAdvantages Under
the FederalSecurities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
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material nonpublic information expects that the recipient will
maintain its confidentiality; or
(3) Whenever a person receives or obtains material nonpublic
information from his or her spouse, parent, child, or sibling;
provided, however, that the person receiving or obtaining the
information may demonstrate that no duty of trust or
confidence existed with respect to the information, by
establishing that he or she neither knew nor reasonably should
have known that the person who was the source of the
information expected that the person would keep the
information confidential, because the parties' history, pattern,
or practice of sharing and maintaining confidences, and because
there was no agreement or understanding to maintain the
confidentiality of the information.'74
The new rule is outside of the SEC's authority under Rule 10b-5 and is
too narrow a view to address what may be possible. Rule 10b5-2(b)(1)
directly contradicts the Supreme Court's rulings in Chiarella and Dirks
that a relationship of trust and confidence must be breached to violate
Rule 10b-5. 75 While the Rule's requirement of an agreement to keep
information confidential is slightly different from saying possession of
information, without more, can violate Rule 10b-5, a contractual
agreement for confidentiality does not necessarily create a fiduciary
duty. 7 6 Such information may be communicated in an arm's length
transaction for proper purposes. An agreement to keep the information
confidential does not create a fiduciary relationship.' 77
The SEC claims that Rule 10b5-2 only embodies what case law has
already acknowledged. 78 Yet any agreement on confidentiality must be
linked with a pre-existing fiduciary relationship. 179 An agreement to keep
information confidential in an arm's length negotiation establishes no
fiduciary relationship or like relationship of trust and confidence'
174. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,738
(Aug. 24,2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.10b5-2).
175. See supra notes 15-31, 72 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Walton v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 623 F. 2d 796, 799 (2d Cir. 1980)
(holding that an agreement by an investment banker to hold a potential takeover target's
financial information confidential created no fiduciary duty where the banker's client was
dealing at arm's length with the target).
177. Id.
178. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,737
(Aug. 24, 2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2).
179. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,652 (1997).
180. Walton, 623 F.2d at 799 (holding that a contract to keep certain information
confidential did not create a fiduciary relationship where the recipient of the information
was negotiating with the provider of the information on an arm's length basis). This case
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Rule 10b5-2(b)(2) and (3) largely embody the test for a fiduciary
relationship adopted by the Second Circuit, which in turn reflects
common law standards.181 The SEC's new rule departs from the Second
Circuit's test, however, in that a relationship with a spouse, parent, child,
or sibling, is presumed to be a fiduciary relationship.'2 Under the rule,
any person charged with having a fiduciary relationship is given the
chance to show that they had no history of sharing confidences or any
expectation that the information would remain confidential.8
The Supreme Court found that insiders owed a uniform fiduciary duty
to shareholders even in the absence of a clear standard at state law.'4
Fiduciary relationships previously recognized do not depend on the
quality of any relationship. Two squabbling partners are just as much
fiduciaries to each other as two cooperating partners. 5
Thus,
relationships with family members and friends should be conclusively
presumed to be fiduciary in nature without inquiry into their quality.
IV. CONCLUSION

The unsettled question under Rule 10b-5 for abuse of material,
nonpublic information in the context of personal dealings should be
resolved so that family kinship or friendship provide a sufficient basis to
find relationships of trust and confidence. When someone receives
material, nonpublic information in the context of sharing personal
confidence and uses that information to trade in securities, the person
should be found in violation of Rule lOb-5 under the misappropriation
theory.
Rule 10b5-2 has the advantage of being a non-inclusive rule.
Nevertheless, Rule lOb-5 may be both overly broad and too narrow a
view of what the SEC can do. The SEC should abandon any inquiry into
the quality of relationships with family members and friends, and should
simply conclude that they all involve relationships of trust and
confidence.

was cited with approval by the Supreme Court in Dirks v. S.E.C., 463 U.S. 646, 662 n.22
(1983).
181. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991).
182. Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading; Final Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,716, 51,238
(Aug. 24,2000) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2).
183. Id.
184. See supra notes 33-43 and accompanying text.
185. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652 (1997).
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